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1. Introduction
Economists have repeatedly pointed to the high costs associated
with trade restrictions. The question who ultimately bears the
burden of these restrictions, however, was given only little
attention until recently. Rates of protection, as measured by
conventional domestic-to-border price ratios point to consumers
of the protected commodities as the only affected group. This is
not surprising because in this framework protection has the joint
effect of a production subsidy combined with an excise tax.
However, as is well known from the public finance literature
[e.g. Harberger (1962)], this does not mean that consumers have
to bear this tax in the end and alone.
Several studies describe the various mechanisms by which policies
to promote and protect import-competing manufacturing activities
discriminate against other activities [e.g. World Bank (1986),
Part II; Valdes (1986)]. Quantitative results suggest that it is
mainly the agricultural sector, particularly the export-oriented
subsector which suffers from inward-looking industrialization .
Moreover, the effects from non-agricultural (indirect) policies
seem to dominate the effects from agriculture-specific (direct)
policies in many developing countries [Schiff (1988); Krueger/
Schiff/Valdes (1988)]. As a result, many direct interventions to
help certain commodities or producers can only be viewed as
reactions to indirect policies originating elsewhere in the
economy, and attempt to compensate for the overall macroeconomic
stance.
The purpose of this paper is: (1) to measure the impact of
industrial import protection on the level and structure of
incentives for total exports, total agricultural exports and
individual agricultural export commodities in the Zimbabwean
economy; and (2) to compare these results with those obtained for
two other agriculture-based developing countries, namely Peru and
Malaysia. In these three countries, the agricultural export
sectors have developed very differently and the question arises
whether the differential performance is due to a different inci-- 2 -
dence effect of non-agricultural import protection on agri-
cultural exports or to different levels of nominal protection in
manufacturing and agriculture.
In order to analyze the incidence of protection, a simple general
equilibrium model developed by Dornbusch (1974) and successfully
used in other quantitative studies [e.g. Garcia (1981) on
Colombia; Oyejide (1986) on Nigeria; Tshibaka (1986) on Zaire;
Greenaway/Milner (1986) on Mauritius; Bautista (1987) on the
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Philippines; Mlambo (1989) on Zimbabwe] is applied. It will be
shown that a fairly high share of industrial protection may be
shifted to producers of agricultural exportables as an implicit
tax in all three countries. This result conforms with findings of
other studies on the subject. However, direct government inter-
ventions in agriculture and manufacturing differ considerably
across the three countries and the question arises whether in-
direct policies are strong enough to change the general pattern
of protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the theoretical model used and explains the shifting
principle. In Section 3 estimates of the incidence parameters are
presented and discussed. Subsequently, the estimates of the
incidence parameters are combined with information on nominal
protection rates for manufacturing and agricultural exportables
to produce true subsidy rates in Section 4. Finally, in Section
5, major results are summarized and conclusions are drawn.
2. The Incidence of Protection: Theoretical Considerations
Following Dornbusch (1974) we consider a simple general equili-
brium model for a small open economy which produces and consumes
three types of final goods: exportables (X), importables (M), and
nontraded goods (N). Since the economy is assumed to be a price
taker on international markets, the domestic prices of both
tradeables are determined by world market prices, the nominal
exchange rate and trade taxes and subsidies. By contrast, the
prices of home goods are determined by domestic supply and- 3 -
demand. However, the prices of home goods are influenced by trade
policy, if home goods and traded goods are substitutable in
production and/or consumption. In this case, trade policy not
only fully determines the domestic relative price of tradeables
but also changes the relative prices between tradeables and home
goods and therefore the real incomes of agents in each sector,
that is, the incidence across sectors. How the incidence is
distributed across sectors, depends essentially on the degree of
substitutability. This can be illustrated more clearly in a
diagram going back to Dornbusch (1974):
In Figure 1 the relative prices of exportables and importables to
home goods (PU/P.T; PV/P.T) are drawn on the vertical and hori- M N X N
zontal axis. The two rays through the origin represent the
relative price between importables and exportables in the free-
trade (OT) and tariff-ridden (OT
1) situation respectively. The
three H-schedules correspond to three substitutability
assumptions:
H
1: Importables and home goods are perfect substitutes, whereas
exportables and home goods are not substitutable;
H
1': Exportables and home goods are perfect substitutes, whereas
importables and home goods are not substitutable;
H: Importables and home goods and exportables and home goods
are imperfect substitutes.
For each case the corresponding H-schedule represents alternative
price ratios for tradeables and home goods which clear the home-
goods market. It is also the locus of price combinations for
which trade equilibrium is attained. Points below and to the left
of the H-lines are points of excess supply and trade deficits,
points above and to the right indicate excess demand and trade
balance surplus. The schedule H'CH
11) represents equilibria where
P../P.T(P-./P.T) remains unaltered and PV/P.T(PU/P.T) decreases MNXN XNMN
(increases) when a tariff is introduced. The intermediate case is
represented by equilibria along H.- 4 -
Figure 1
The Effects of Trade Taxes on Relative Prices
H"
For this latter case, assume that a tariff is introduced. Begin-
ning with an equilibrium at point A, the imposition of the tariff
initially raises the domestic relative prices of importables in
terms of both exportables and home goods by the amount of the
tariff. The economy moves to point C in Figure 1. However, the
shift in relative prices provides incentives to increase the
domestic production of import substitutes. As a result, resources
are diverted from home goods and exportables. At the same time,
the change in relative prices induces consumers to shift their
demand away from importables to home goods and exportables. In
the sector producing home goods, the resulting excess demand
places upward pressure on prices until they reach a new home-
goods market equilibrium. These adjustments lead to a new
equilibrium position for the economy at point B, where:— C _
- the domestic price of importables relative to the price of
exportables has increased by the full amount of the tariff
because the country cannot influence its foreign terms of
trade;
- the domestic price of importables relative to the price of home
goods has increased, but by less than the full amount of the
tariff because the nominal price of home goods has also risen
somewhat;
- the domestic price of exportables has fallen relative to both
the price of home goods and that of importables.
Thus, only a certain proportion of protection is an advantage to
producers of import substitutes, while the remainder is shifted
on to exporters as an implicit tax. This means that the "true"
tariff [ A(PM/P.,)] is positive but falls short of the nominal M n
tariff while the "true" subsidy [ A (PV/PM)] to exporters is
negative.
If other substitutional relationships exist, then the incidence
results will differ from the above. If importables and home goods
are perfect substitutes, the domestic prices of these goods can-
not differ (law of one price). In this situation the import
sector is no longer granted any true protection while the whole
burden is shifted onto producers of exportables. In Figure 1, the
new equilibrium would be at point D. If importables and home
goods are, at the other extreme, not substitutable, then the
price of home goods remains unchanged. This situation is re-
presented by point C. The tariff now provides the full amount of
protection to the import sector while the burden of protection is
equally shared by exporters and producers of nontradeables.
One could imagine a lot of substitutional relationships that
differ from the two extreme cases, but all. of them must lie
between points C and D. To evaluate the incidence of protection
is, therefore, up or our empirical analysis.- 6 -
3. Empirical Results for Zimbabwe, Malaysia and Peru
Against the background of the theoretical considerations above,
the incidence parameters for Zimbabwe were estimated. Since the
incidence parameter is defined as the elasticity of the price
ratio between nontradeables and exportables (P /P ) with respect
N X
to the price ratio between importables and exportables (Pw/Pv),
M X
this gives us the following basic test equation.
ln(PN/Px)fc = constant + Q In (PM/Px>t + ufc (1)
As shown by Garcia (1981), this equation may be disaggregated as
necessary to take account of several exportable and importable
subsectors. The information required to estimate omega is price
movements of importables, exportables and non-tradeables.
Ideally, one would rely on producer prices.
In estimating the global and disaggregated forms of the incidence
parameter, an important modification is required before equation
(1) can be used. Estimations based on time-series data would
violate the assumption of constant real income and of a balanced
external account. Hence, income (Y) as measured by real GDP and
the trade balance (BOT) have to be included as additional
variables in the regression equations. There are then two basic
equations to be estimated.
















+ a BOTt + p In Yfc + ufc (3)
where Pv is either the price index for individual agricultural
export commodities or an export-share-weighted price index for
all agricultural exportables recognized and PyN« is an export-share-weighted price index for all other exportables not included
The regression equations were estimated on the basis of annual
data for 1966-87. Initially, ordinary least squares (OLS) tech-
niques were used. For all equations estimated there was, however,
evidence of positive autocorrelation. In each case, therefore,
the model was re-estimated using the Cochrane/Orcutt iterative
procedure.
In addition to total exports, estimates are produced for
Zimbabwe's major agricultural export goods, i.e. maize, coffee,
cotton, tobacco and beef as well as for all five agricultural
export categories taken together. Yearly information on unit
import and unit export values in Zimbabwean dollar from the
Central Statistical Office (CSO) and on producer prices for indi-
vidual agricultural export commodities from Rukovo (1990) to-
gether with information on export revenues according to the
standard international trade classification (SITC) from CSO were
used to construct price indices for individual export commo-
dities, total agricultural exportables and other exportables. For
each of the export categories, four variables are used as proxies
for home goods: the building material price index (PN1), the
component of domestic workers' wages in the consumer price index
(CPI) (PN2)'
 tn





CPI for higher and lower income urban families (PN4>• Moreover,
the export price index for total agricultural exports and other
exports was calculated with different weights, explanatory
variables were taken out and the dynamic structure of the
relationship was explored by estimating a distributed lag model.
Sources and data for all the variables used as well as the
weighting scheme applied are given in Wiebelt (1990), Appendices
1-3.
The results of estimating the shift parameter are presented in
Tables 1 and 2. The former gives details for estimates using a
basic model where the building material price index (PN1) appro-
ximates price movements for home goods whilst the latter presents- 8 -
Table 1: Estimates of the Incidence Paraneter Q for Total Exports, Total Agricultural Exports and Individual Agri-
















































































































































a Values in parentheses are t-values, Rho is the regression coefficient of the Cochrane/Orcutt procedure, R is
the corrected coefficient of determination, F the F-value and DH the Durbin-Satson-statistic.
Source: Own computations. P., P and P are taken from Kiebelt (1990), Appendix 1. P is constructed as a weighted
export price index tor tne five individual export commodities where the respective earnings in 1980 are used as
weights. Analogous, P ... is an export price index for all other exports not included in P .omega estimates for alternative model specifications. The depen-
dent variable for each equation is listed in the top line of the
tables and the estimated coefficients for each independent vari-
able (or model) is found by looking at the corresponding cell
under the relevant line heading.
The statistical characteristics for all regression results are
quite good. The estimated Durbin-Watson statistics mean that the
null hypothesis of no positive autocorrelation cannot be re-
jected. The overall explanatory power of all models is satis-
factory, the F-statistics are significant at the 1 percent con-
fidence level in all cases, and the estimates of the incidence
parameter are significantly greater than zero at conventional
levels in all but three models.
From the results obtained for the value of Q, it can be concluded
that a major proportion of the incidence of commercial policy
interventions designed to protect the importables may be shifted
to the export sector in the form of an implicit export tax. As an
example, the estimate of Q in the basic model (Table 1) suggests
that the share of incidence borne by the exportable sector is 76
percent. In general, this implies that Zimbabwe's home goods and
importables are fairly close substitutes in both consumption and
production whereas the relationship between home goods and ex-
portables is weak. It also reflects that Zimbabwe's exportables
are fairly inelastic in supply. Hence, they tend to absorb a
large proportion of the tariff incidence in the form of reduced
rents to the fixed factors of production.
The estimated value of the incidence parameter for total agri-
cultural exports (0.65) is lower than for total exports (0.75).
This implies that a one percent tariff will decrease the relative
price of total exports by 0.75 percent, but the relative price of
agricultural (non-agricultural) exports will fall marginally less
(more) than total exports. Obviously, technological and demand
characteristics are such that there is less substitutability
between non-agricultural exportables and home goods than between
4
agricultural exportables and home goods. This pattern of inci-- 10 -
dence contrasts with empirical evidence for other developing
countries where traditional agricultural exportables exhibit a
larger degree of incidence than non-traditional industrial ex-
ports [e.g. in the Ivory Coast; see Greenaway (1989)]. It accords
well with a priori theorizing since these other exports are
mainly natural resource-based.
Within the agricultural export sector estimates of the incidence
parameter in the basic model vary between 0.43 for beef and 0.76
for coffee with those for maize, cotton and tobacco lying between
these two extremes. The results for beef contrast with the find-
ings of Mlambo (1989) and can be explained by differences in the
data base used. Whereas Mlambo used export price indices [Mlambo
(1989), p. 255, Table 6, footnote] we relied on producer prices,
since these are the prices which determine producers' decisions.
As clearly shown by Rukovo (1990), nominal protection is high for
beef. This explains the large discrepancy between Mlambo's
estimate of 0.88 and our estimate of 0.43. Obviously, beef
producers (mostly large scale commercial farmers) are aware of
the eroding effect of increasing home-goods prices and success-
fully lobbied for higher nominal subsidies to compensate for
disprotection by commercial policy.
Modifying the basic model as indicated in Table 2 has only a
minor effect on the regression results. As can be seen, the in-
cidence parameters are fairly stable across different model spe-
cifications. They are generally high and range from 0.66 to 0.83
for total exports; they are equally concentrated for total agri-
cultural exports, varying from 0.53 to 0.70. There is no clear
pattern with regard to food exports (maize, coffee and beef) and
cash crops (cotton and tobacco). The range of Q for coffee ex-
ports is between 0.65 and 0.84. The incidence is much lower for
beef (0.29 to 0.47), while that for maize, cotton and tobacco is
nearly the same lying between 0.57 and 0.76.- 11 -








Model 3: Smaller model
(no BOT and no Y variable)
Kodel_4: Different speci-
fication of P and P
Ann An
a) weights of 1978
b) weights of 1985
ModelJ: Different speci-
fication of the income
variable (lagged one
period)













































































































































a Values in parentheses are t-values. - The basic model (Model 1) is the model shown in Table 1. All models,
except Model 6 were corrected for autocorrelation with the Cochrane/Orcutt iteration procedure.
Source: Own computations based on data presented in Hiebelt (1990), Appendix 1.- 12 -
The modifications of the basic model stress the robustness of the
estimates of Q. The general conclusion is that the incidence of
commercial policy in Zimbabwe is high. This has important impli-
cations for the level and structure of incentives.
Similar results have been obtained for Peru and Malaysia. From
Table 3, it can be seen that the incidence parameters are fairly
stable across different model specifications n both countries.
They are generally high and range between 0.42 and 0.92 for total
exports. For individual agricultural exports, they are in all
specifications higher than 0.55 and lie around 1 in various
models. Given the results of the sensitivity analysis, it seems
save to conclude that total exports and major agricultural export
goods bear the major burden of import protection in all three
countries. They are significantly more heavily taxed than the
nontradeable sector. Import protection drives up nontradeable
prices whereas the prices of exportables remain basically un-
affected. Similar incidence parameters do not mean, however, that
the taxation of the agricultural export sectors is of a similar
magnitude in all three countries. The nominal protection rates
for manufacturing and the agricultural export crops matter, too.
4. True Protection of Imports and Exports
As shown by Greenaway/Milner (1987) and Greenaway (1989),
estimates of the shift parameter can be combined with information
on nominal import tariffs and nominal export subsidies to cal-
culate "true tariff rates" and "true subsidy rates", i.e. the
extent to which the prices of importables and exportables rise or
fall relative to the numeraire, non-tradeables. Thus, the true
tariff rate t* is defined as:
t* . A !M = i±t tzd z P.. l+d
 x 1+d
N
and the true subsidy rate s* is analogously given by:Bibtiofhek
- 13 - des Instituts fur Welhvirtschaft







































Source: Compiled from Wiebelt (1990), Table 2 for Zimbabwe and Herrmann/
Sulaiman/Wiebelt (1989), Tables 3 and 5 for Malaysia and Peru.
= A I* = l±s
N
where d = P.. = QPM + (1-Q) Pv N M X
d « Qt + (l-Q)s (6)
In equations (4) to (6), d is the proportional change in the
home-goods price and t and s refer to the nominal tariff rate and
nominal subsidy rate respectively. A hat (*) denotes a pro-
portional change in a variable.- 14 -
From equation (6) it follows that the proportional increase in
the price of home goods following trade restrictions is composed
of two elements: that part of the increase shifted on from the
rise in the price of importables due to the tariff (Qt) and that
part of the increase shifted on from the rise in the domestic
price of exportables due to the subsidy [(l-Q)'s]. Since our
primary interest is on the effects of tariffs on manufacturing at
given export subsidies, we will assume Pv to be zero. Thus
equation (6) reduces to
d = Qt. (7)
Clearly, if importables and home goods are perfect substitutes
(Q=l) then d=t and t*=0 whereas the sign (and value) of s* is
ambiguous depending on s t. In this case importables enjoy no
true protection relative to home goods. Exports are truly dis-
criminated against if nominal tariffs exceed nominal subsidies.
If on the other extreme, importables cannot replace home goods in
production and consumption (Q=0), then d=0 and s*=s. It may be
noted parenthetically that importables may be truly disprotected
despite nominal protection. This is the case, if the increase in
the home-goods price resulting from export subsidies exceeds
nominal tariffs on importables. Such repercussions, which are
induced by export promotion policies, have been discussed in a
preliminary study on Zimbabwe [Wiebelt (1990)] but are not the
focus of this paper.
Rukovo (1990) provides details on nominal taxes and subsidies for
three Zimbabwean agricultural exportables (maize, beef and
cotton) and Herrmann et al. (1990) and Aziz (1990a) compiled
similar information on the most important agricultural export-
ables in Peru and Malaysia. It is interesting to combine this
information with average tariff rates for total manufacturing as
computed by Erzan et al.. (1989) to generate estimates of true
protection for the three countries. The actual procedure for
estimating true tariff and subsidy rates is to use unweighted
averages of the shift parameters reported in Table 3 to estimate
d from equation (7) and then substitute this into equations (4)- 15 -
and (5) to get t* and s*. The results of this exercise together
with the nominal tariff and subsidy rates as well as the shift
parameters used are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
According to the figures in Table 4 nominal subsidy rates on
exports in Zimbabwe varied between -59% and 123% for maize,
between -69% and 238% for beef and between -33% and 31% for
cotton in the period 1981/82 to 1986/87. The true subsidy rates
on exports range from -70.1% to 225.6% depending on the value of
the shift parameter and the value of nominal duties or subsidies
on exportables. Other things equal, s* will increase as Q falls
[equations (5) and (6)]. To give an example, if both, maize and
beef are nominally subsidized by 18% in 1981/82 this would lead
to a higher true subsidy for beef (13.7%) than for maize (10.6%).
This follows immediately from the dampening effect of a smaller
omega on the nontradeables price.
Where agricultural exports are nominally subsidized, they are
also truly subisidized. In other words, disprotection from a 10%
import tariff on manufactures is insufficient to offset pro-
tection granted by nominal export subsidies. Where agricultural
exports are nominally taxed, true discrimination is higher than
nominal discrimination. The case where the implicit tax is at a
maximum is that which pertains to maize. This follows immediately
from the relative high shift parameter, which means that non-
tradeables prices for maize producers rise to a greater extent.
In this case, protection brought about by export subsidies is
diminished strongly by nominal protection of manufacturing im-
ports .
From Table 4, it can be seen that the true tariff on manufactures
is much lower than the nominal tariff. This follows because
importables and home goods are close substitutes. In this case,
a large proportion of the tariff burden is shifted on to ex-
porters. However, it also means that home-goods prices increase
drastically thereby undermining true protection. This may provide
one explanation of the tendency for protection of importables to
increase over time. If true protection is less than nominal- 16 -





Parameter (Q) 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Nominal Tariff on.
























































True tariffs and true subsidies are calculated on the basis of an unweighted average
incidence parameter calculated from the extreme values given in Table 3. - The nominal
tariff rate is an unweighted average tariff rate for total manufactures as calculated by
Erzan et al. (1989). - Unweighted nominal subsidy rates are taken from Rukovo (1990).
They are based on export parity prices by accounting for internal marketing and transport
margins. Information on nominal protection rates for coffee and tobacco was not avail-
able.
Source: Own computations based on Erzan et al. (1989), Rukovo (1990) and the results
given in Table 3.
protection this provides a motive for pressing for further
protection.
From the results given in Table 4 one can conclude that the
prevailing average tariff rate for total manufacturing has only a
minor impact on agricultural incentives. Low nominal import
protection together with similar incidence parameters for the
three agricultural exports means that the level and structure of
protection in the agricultural export sector is not affected
profoundly by import tariffs. Furthermore, nominal tariffs and
subsidies on agricultural exportables are very high. However, it
may be expected that other macroeconomic measures like the- 17 -
foreign exchange allocation system provide strong disincentives
to agricultural exports in Zimbabwe.
Turning to an analysis of the protection structure in Malaysia
and Peru, the picture changes drastically (Table 5):
1. With the exception of cocoa in Malaysia, both countries
directly tax their main export crops. The magnitude of the
tax, however, is much higher in Peru than in Malaysia. In
Peru, farmgate prices for coffee and cotton are on average 63%
and 70% below border prices. By contrast, direct taxation of
agricultural exportables in Malaysia is fairly moderate,
ranging from 16% for rubber to 4% for palm oil. Moreover,
export taxation for Malaysia's main export , crops decreased
during the period of investigation, whereas it remained nearly
g
constant at high levels in Peru.
2. In Malaysia, the average nominal protection rate for manu-
facturing is about 16% in the period 1980 to 1985. With
average incidence parameters of 0.77, 0.97 and 0.94 for
rubber, oil palm and cocoa respectively, the corresponding
true tariff rates average 25%, 17% and 13%. Except for rubber
in the period 1980-1983, indirect discrimination exceeds
direct discrimination brought about by export taxes. As can be
seen from Table 5, even in years where the apparent intent (as
judged by low or zero direct taxation) was not to discriminate
against agricultural exportables, the negative impact of
indirect protection was large enough to lead to strong overall
taxation. In spite of zero direct taxation for cocoa, the true
tax rate was 13%. Similarly, palm oil carried a tax burden of
15% in 1983 to 1985, instead of explicit taxes of only 2%.
3. Import tariffs averaged about 41% in Peru between 1980 and
1985. Given the average incidence parameters of 0.81 for
coffee and 0..85 for cotton, the prices of nontradeables for
these sectors following from the average import tariff in-
crease by 33% and 35% respectively. Thus, manufacturing
protection places an additional heavy burden on export crops.
The true tax rates falling on coffee and cotton producers- 18 -















































































































































Source: Own computations based on Herrmann et al. (1990), Aziz (1990a), Erzan et al.
(1989) and the results given in Table 3.
average 72% and 77% when the implicit tax component is accounted
for. Of the total tax rates for coffee and cotton, around 13% and
9% can be traced back to indirect discrimination via protection
of manufactured products.- 19 -
Summing up, the results show that direct and indirect policies
are important in all three countries. Government intervention in
producer prices has generally been favourable to agricultural
production in Zimbabwe. However, import tariffs are largely
shifted on to producers of exportables, either because home goods
and importables are fairly close substitutes or because agri-
cultural exportables are fairly inelastic in supply. As a result,
true subsidy rates are much lower than nominal rates. In Malaysia
and Peru, agricultural exports are discriminated against by both
direct and indirect policies. In Malaysia, implicit taxation via
import protection exceeds explicit taxation by sector-specific
measures. The degree of taxation is highest in Peru due to a
higher nominal protection rate for the manufacturing sector and
high nominal discrimination against agricultural export crops.
Together with high import tariffs for manufactures, the high
incidence parameters in Peru lead to high indirect taxes on
Peru's main agricultural exportables.
5. Summary and Conclusions
It was the objective of this paper to elaborate the implications
of import protection in the non-agricultural sector for agricul-
tural exports in a comparative study of Zimbabwe, Malaysia and
Peru. To estimate the effect on prices of a system of tariffs and
subsidies on imports and exports, a simple general equilibrium
model incorporating importables, exportables and home goods was
used and different protection measures were calculated and
compared. The major results that emerge from our analysis can be
summarized as follows:
1. The empirical results obtained for Zimbabwe, Malaysia and Peru
confirm experiences gained in other studies on the subject. In
particular, they underline the importance of macroeconomic
repercussions of commercial policy for the agricultural
sector. The estimates of the incidence parameters indicate
that the degree of shifting the burden of commercial policies
onto exporters is high in all three countries. The point
estimates of Sjaastad's omega are highly significant and range- 20 -
for all export categories (except beef in Zimbabwe) and in all
model specifications above 0.5, in some cases even above 0.9.
This implies that the impact of a tariff on imports falls
almost entirely on producers of exportable agricultural
products.
2. Similar incidence parameters do not mean, however, that the
discrimination of the agricultural sectors is similar across
the three countries. The nominal protection rates for the
manufacturing sector and the agricultural export crops matter,
too. Peru, the country with a poorly performing agricultural
export sector, protected its manufacturing sector much more
strongly than Zimbabwe and Malaysia and taxed its agricultural
export crops more heavily than Malaysia. This implies that the
true discrimination of agricultural export crops is clearly
higher in Peru than in Malaysia and Zimbabwe.
3. Direct government intervention in agriculture in Zimbabwe has
generally been favourable to maize and beef producers whereas
cotton exports show no clear protection pattern. Moreover,
average nominal tariffs on manufacturing has been rather low
during the period of investigation. Together with similar
incidence parameters for the three agricultural exportables
this means that the structure of protection in the agri-
cultural sector has not been affected profoundly by indirect
protection. This result contrasts sharply with the findings
for other LDCs and may be seen as a model for agricultural
policy in other African countries.
The analysis suggests that the more successful performance of
agricultural exports in Malaysia and Zimbabwe can be explained by
the smaller degree of direct and indirect taxation due to lower
negative or high positive protection coefficients rather than by
lower incidence parameters. Given the high and similar incidence
parameters in all three countries, policy makers have to focus on
the modification of the relevant nominal protection rates if they
want to improve the performance of their agricultural export
sectors. Nominal protection rates of manufactured goods would
have to fall and those for agricultural export crops would have
to increase.- 21 -
Notes
1 For the economies of Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile,
Brazil, and Peru Clements and Sjastaad (1984) estimated that
exporters in all these countries, and producers of import-com-
peting foodstuffs in some of them, have paid at least half of
the cost of industrialization programs. For Zimbabwe, the
current exchange rate control system is estimated to result in
a total net transfer out of agriculture on the order of half a
billion dollars; an amount which by far exceeds the entire
budget of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Re-
settlement [Masters (1989)]. ,
2 Other concepts were also used to analyze the incidence of
protection. In the World Bank's project on "The Political
Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policies" the real-exchange-
rate effects of general macroeconomic policies are calculated
and the price effects of direct and indirect agricultural
policies are compared. Descriptions and first results on the
comparative study, which encompasses 18 detailed country
studies are summarized in Krueger/ Schiff/Valdes (1988) and
Schiff (1988). Published country studies include Avillez/
Finan/Josling (1988) on Portugal, Greene/Roe (1989) on the
Dominican Republic, Jansen (1988) on Zambia, Garcia/Llamas
(1989) on Colombia, Dethier (1989) on Egypt, Jenkins/Lai
(1989) on Malaysia, Tuluy/Salinger (1989) on Morocco,
Siamwalla/Setboonsarng (1989) on Thailand and Moon/Kang (1989)
on Korea. Other studies on the role of macroeconomic policies
for agricultural incentives are based on computable general
equilibrium models [e.g. Amranand/Grais (1984) for Thailand,
Michel/Noel (1984) for the Ivory Coast and Wiebelt (1989) for
Peninsular Malaysia].
3 A more detailed description and illustration of the shifting
principle and the concept of true protection is provided by
Greenaway/Milner (1987).
4 This presumption is confirmed by the results of the following
regression for non-agricultural exportables:












3 BOT + 0.2373 lnY
(-0.52) (0.41)
Rho = -0.1999; R* = 0.73; F = 14.83; DW = 1.89
(-0.21)
As indicated by the regression results the incidence parameter
for non-agricultural exports is higher than the estimator for
agricultural exports (Table 1). This implies that the substi-
tutability between importables (exportables) and home goods is
higher (lower) for non-agricultural exportables than in the
case of agricultural exportables.
5 See Rukovo (1990) and Takavarasha (1990) for analyses of
direct agricultural pricing policies in Zimbabwe.- 22 -
6 Nominal protection rates for fishmeal were not available.
7 Differences in direct taxation of estate and smallholder
rubber are attributable to research and replanting cesses
which are actual transfer payments by smallholders to the
future, and can be redeemed through adapting new technology
and replanting.
8 See Herrmann (1989) and- Jenkins/Lai (1989) for a description
of the evolution of protection of export crops and food crops
in Peru and Malaysia since the 1960s. Cocoa policy in Malaysia
is described in Aziz (1990b).- 23 -
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